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COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY ON PRESENTATIONS OF
PROF. ROBERTA S. KARMEL &
PROF. JAMES A. FANTO"
Gregory S. Alexandert
Okay. It's Friday afternoon, getting very close to 4:00. This
is the last panel of this two day conference. I think I
understand my role. I will be brief.
Roberta Karmel and Jim Fanto were very wise to choose
me as one of the commentators at this point because as I
suspect they knew, I have little, if any, great interest or value
to add to these two valuable papers. I have just three
observations to make, and I will make them briefly. I promise.
The first is that "Social Security privatization" is an
oxymoron, or put somewhat differently, "there is no escaping
the state." Here, I am completely agreeing with Morton
Klevan's comments earlier. Roberta's paper is particularly
valuable in this respect pointing out in a wonderful survey the
variety of ways in which Social Security privatization
inevitably entails a great deal of state involvement not only
because it is state-initiated and state-implemented, but
because it may ultimately lead to greater state supervisory or
regulatory control. Now, one does not have to be a great
admirer of the state to think that this is so.
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Quoting from Richard Posner's recent book, Aging and Old
Age, (I take it that we can all stipulate that Judge Posner is no
unabashed apologist for the state), "if social security were
replaced by a law that 'simply' required people to save for their
old age, something like ERISA would be necessary to make the
law more than an empty gesture."
My second observation is one that follows up on Jim
Fanto's very interesting paper, focusing as it does on the role
of norms. The ultimate political success of Social Security
privatization depends on investor norms. That seems
absolutely clear to me. However, I am not simply speaking of
norms of investor education but of norms of trust as well.
Here, the role of institutions-which institutions become more
powerful, achieve a more paramount position-is crucial. The
questions are in what situations, and in which institutions, is
trust more likely to exist. Institutions of the state alone?
Institutions such as investment advisors, investment
managers, life insurance companies and the like? A closely
related question is in which institutions is the trust
warranted? And, finally, are the answers to these two
questions going to be the same?
Closely following up on that point is my third observation,
which is that the decision whether participation should be in
the kind of scheme we currently have, a pay-as-you-go system
completely controlled by the state, or through some sort of
private individual account system inevitably indicates what
form of individual account system individuation will take.
Specifically, what I have in mind is what is the appropriate
degree of control the individual employee will, or should, have
over the assets that he or she is saving?
Jeff Gordon's comments earlier this morning were
particularly valuable in this respect, focusing as they did on
the fact that we are engaging in stage four planning. I think
that is precisely what we are talking about here. Moreover, as
I think Jeff very accurately pointed out, Bob Clark may have
been guessing wrong when he predicted that stage four would
involve, in effect, the rise of, or the increasing degree of
passivity on the part of, employee savers through, for example,
defined benefit plans rather than defined contribution plans.
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Since Bob's paper was written, we have certainly seen some
evidence of a trend away from defined benefit plans and
toward defined contribution plans.
Jeff made a very strong case for defined benefit plans, and
I am in no position to disagree with that at all. It does seem to
me, though, that there may be a case to be made for a defined
contribution plan or something which involves more employee
participant control over the saved assets. The case I have in
mind would be based on the level of trust that the public has
in whatever scheme is going to replace Social Security. Let us
distinguish between active and passive investment not in the
way in which Deborah Weiss defined it, which I took to mean
basically the distinction between investments in index fund
versus fund managers picking and choosing, but rather in
terms of the degree of control that the individual participant
has over the use of his or her account.
Passive investment is one that follows the traditional trust
law model, vesting virtually all control, albeit in a fiduciary
capacity, to some intermediary. Active ownership is an
arrangement that reverses Dean Clark's historical trend by
gradually conflating the distinction between beneficial
ownership and control. The beneficial owner has greater
control over precisely how his or her saved assets are used,
rather than being entirely dependent upon the expertise of
investment managers or advisors.
I think it is arguable that the public will have greater
trust in a system that gives the individual a greater voice in
the management and use of what is, after all, his or her
property. This may be so despite the fact that greater control
carries with it greater risks. In other words, I am suggesting
that, paradoxically, the more trusted forms of retirement asset
management may be those that are riskier. The reason is that
greater self-control gives the owner a stronger sense of
security. I do not have time to elaborate on this idea here, so I
will stop at this point.
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